The contribution of this paper to the literature is three-fold: (1) it empirically uncovers the directionality and persistence of systemic risk surrounding "the great recession"; (2) it quanti…es the reaction of the macro-economy to …nancial (banking) system shocks; and (3) it unearths feedback e¤ects from the macro-economy to the (in)stability of a banking system. These contributions are attained by looking at the extremal dependence structure among banks, by presenting a multivariate framework for identifying and modeling their joint-tail distributions, and by constructing an aggregate system-wide distress index, a risk-stability index, which quanti…es the systemic risk of a bank.
Introduction
The recent …nancial crisis has highlighted the need to better understand the drivers of systemic (…nancial) risk and its reciprocal relationship with real economic activity. Therefore, spotting macro-systemic-risk linkages through a reliable and well-behaved framework can make it possible to devise macro-prudential tools and policies. Recently, both policymakers and academics have begun to discriminate between the "size"of a …nancial institution and its systemic importance. For example, Bernanke (2009) focuses on …nancial institutions that are "too interconnected to fail", while Rajan (2009) uses the term "too systemic to fail". Despite this divergence in terminology, during periods of severe distress, there is an incentive to prevent the collapse of risk factors (e.g. …nancial institutions, and/or exchange rates) because such failures can pose signi…cant risks to the …nancial system, and consequently to the broader real economy. Accordingly, a trend has developed towards focusing on the macro-prudential perspective of banking regulation (see Aspachs et al., 2007; Goodhart et al., 2005 Goodhart et al., , 2006 Lehar, 2005) . However, as the 'great recession' has highlighted, policymakers and academics do not fully understand how risk spreads within and between …nancial systems, or which institutions can become systemically important or too interconnected to fail. Moreover, there is insu¢ cient knowledge about the e¤ects and desirability of particular regulatory macro-prudential measures. Accordingly, the contribution of this paper is three-fold: …rst, it empirically uncovers the directionality and persistence of distress surrounding "the great recession"; second, it quanti…es the reaction of the macro-economy to …nancial system shocks; and third, the paper unearths feedback e¤ects from the macro-economy to the (in)stability of a banking system. The literature on contagion and systemic risk in the banking system can be classi…ed into two categories: (i) direct channels, such as interbank markets, that systemically link banks;
(ii) indirect channels, such as similar portfolio holdings in bank balance sheets. Studies in the …rst category focus on the contagion e¤ect; that is, an extreme event in one risk factor may cause an extreme event in other risk factors. Speci…cally, Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2004) , focus on modeling the interbank market; while Cifuentes et al. (2005) go a step further, and consider two channels: (1) similar portfolio holdings, and (2) mutual credit exposure. This latter study shows that contagion propagates through changes in asset prices; that is, the indirect channel dominates. The second category focuses on the modeling of systemic risk and indirect channels. Lugano¤ and Schreft (2001) assume that the return of one bank's portfolio depends on the portfolio allocation of other banks. Given this assumption, they show that crises spread due to forward-looking behavior. De Vries (2005) starts from the fat-tail property of the underlying assets shared by banks, and argues that this creates the potential for a systemic breakdown (for comprehensive surveys on systemic risk modeling, see De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; Allen et al., 2009 ).
Recent developments in multivariate EVT (mEVT ) provides the opportunity to investigate extreme co-movements, which go to the heart of this paper. For instance, mEVT has been applied to measure risk contagion across di¤erent …nancial markets in Longin and Solnik (2001) Several measures of systemic risk have recently appeared in empirical studies. For instance, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) construct a metric for …nancial stability, which they call the PAO ("probability that at least one bank becomes distressed"). However, the PAO only re ‡ects the probability of having at least one extra distress, without specifying the size of the systemic impact. Zhou (2010) extends the PAO measure by proposing a "systemic impact index" (SSI), which measures the expected number of bank failures in a banking system given that one particular bank fails. The di¤erence between the PAO and the SSI is that the latter is more explicit about "systemic impact". The research herein applies the multivariate extreme value theory (mEVT ) methodology to a portfolio composed of 30 banks from around the world, and calculates a riskstability index (RSI) based on Garita and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2010) . This index quanti…es systemic risk in a …nancial system, and for the purposes herein, is based on forward-looking price information stemming from credit default swap (CDS) spreads. One advantage of utilizing this risk-stability index, is that it reveals the importance of di¤erent risk factors (e.g. banks) in causing systemic risk, where the potential for a systemic breakdown of the …nancial system can be either weak or strong (see De Vries, 2005) , depending on whether the "conditional probability of joint failure" fades away or remains asymptotically (see Garita and Zhou, 2009) . Accordingly, the international monetary and …nancial system can be described as being relatively stable in the former case, while in the latter case it is more fragile.
The results indicate that, on average, Asian banks create slightly more instability to the …nancial system, very closely followed by U.S. banks, and then by European banks. Second, an increase of the RSI lowers the federal funds rate, while increasing the slope of the term structure.
This result suggests that monetary policy reacts to …nancial instability concerns. The results of the panel VAR also indicate that a higher conditional probability of joint failure, and an increased sensitivity of market participants to higher failure risk deteriorates the general market by lowering the returns to the S&P 500. Moreover, the perception of market participants that the VIX is the "fear index" is corroborated by the results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index increases the implied volatility of the market. Third, the paper unearths feedback e¤ects from the macro-economy to the (in)stability of a banking system. These latter set of results indicate that "leaning against the wind" can help reduce the systemic risk of a …nancial system. Last but not least, the results show that an improvement in the returns to the S&P 500, as well as a reduction of market volatility, reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk.
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows: Section 2 will discuss the measures of dependence employed herein. Section 3 provides and discusses the results stemming from the RiskStability Index, and also looks at the directionality of contagion and the persistence of distress surrounding "the great recession". Section 4 takes advantage of the time-series properties of the Risk-Stability Index, and estimates a panel VAR that links the instability of a …nancial system to the macro-economy. Lastly, section 5 concludes.
Measures of Dependence

Multivariate EVT: tail dependence
To assess V aR at a low probability level p, univariate EVT can be used to model the tail behavior of a "loss". However, since the focus herein is on "systemic risk", I omit the details on univariate risk modelling (for a formal analysis of univariate EVT, see Embrechts et al., 1997) . Multivariate EVT (mEVT ) takes into account more than the tail behavior of each individual risk factor, since it also looks at the extreme co-movements among them. Moreover, this approach makes it possible to …nd (possible) contagion e¤ects stemming from "distress" in one risk factor in relation to other risk factors in a system. Let X = (X 1 ; :::; X d ) denote the losses of d individual risk factors, where each risk factor X i follows a univariate EVT setup with its own tail index i and scale function a i (t). Therefore, for any x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x d > 0, as ! 0, we have:
where VaR denotes the value-at-risk of X i , and L is a …nite positive function. The L-function characterizes the co-movement of extreme events that X i exceeds a high threshold V aR i (x i ).
(x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x d ) controls the level of the level of high threshold, which in turn controls the direction of extreme co-movements. However, this time around the values will be delimited between 1 and the number of risk factors d; the estimation procedure follows Huang (1992) . Following Hartman et al. (2004) , assume a system of two banks with loss returns X and Y . From the de…nition in (1) we have
As noted by De Haan and Ferreira (2006) , 1 L(1; 1) 2. A value for L(1; 1) equal to 1 indicates complete tail dependence. If L(1; 1) equals 2, then it indicates tail independence. In the case there is an interest in looking at a multidimensional setting (e.g. the e¤ects of one bank's failure on the rest of the …nancial system), as is the case in this paper, then equation (2) can be modi…ed accordingly. For an exposition of how the L-function is connected to the modern instrument of dependence modeling -the copula -see Zhou (2010) .
Risk-Stability Index (RSI)
Building on the mEVT framework previously discussed, I construct a risk-stability index based on Garita and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2010) . As stated in the introduction, this index makes it possible to quantify the e¤ect that a "failure" of any risk factor can have on an entire …nancial system, be it economy-wide or worldwide. For expositional purposes on the construction of the RSI, assume that a …nancial system consists of three banks. From equation (1) we know that
For bank X i , the RSI is de…ned as:
E(number of crises in X 2 and X 3 j X 1 is in crisis)
Denote = 1fX i > V aR i ( )g as X i being in crisis, for i = 1; 2; 3. Using this to rewrite (3), we obtain:
Note that the above expression can be rewritten as the sum of two expectations as follows:
Rewriting (5) in terms of probabilities, and by using equation 11 (see the Appendix) we get:
By using equation (1) in the above expression, it is easy to show that:
or in the three-bank example:
An RSI close to d 1 means that risk-factor i has a high in ‡uence on the …nancial system, while an RSI close to 0 implies a negligible in ‡uence of risk-factor i on the …nancial system.
Empirical Results
Empirical Setup and Data
The well-being of the banking sector is (arguably) re ‡ected in credit default swap spreads, since CDS spreads are a type of insurance against credit risk. 1 However, it is worth pointing out that there are those who argue against the reliability of CDS spreads as a trustworthy indicator of a …rms' …nancial health. The main criticism being that CDS spreads may overstate a …rm's "fundamental" risk when: (i) the CDS market is illiquid, and (ii) when the …nancial system is frothing with risk aversion. Even though these types of arguments might be accurate, they can become self-ful…lling factors if they have a real e¤ect on the eagerness of the market to …nance a particular …rm (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009) Table 1 alongside the descriptive statistics of their CDS spreads.
From Table 1 , we can observe that all daily CDS spreads exhibit high kurtosis relative to the kurtosis of the normal distribution, which is 3. This indicates that the CDS spreads may follow a heavy-tailed distribution. Moreover, the skewness of the CDS spreads is positive, indicating that the heavy-tailedness comes from the right-hand side of the distribution -high premiums paid by the protection buyer to the seller. Interestingly, from the descriptive statistics, we can also discern a large variation on the market perception of riskiness of the banks. The top four risky banks in the list Woori, Shinhan, Hana, and Morgan Stanley are approximately two to three times more risky than the "safest" banks, DBS and HSBC.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is imperative to calculate the number of high-ordered statistics k, by using an estimator for the L(1; 1) function. The standard approach in the literature is to look at the L(1; 1) f unction for di¤erent k, and for all the bilateral relationships, with the aim to "let the tail speak for itself". 2 The solution to this trade-o¤ for each bilateral relationship yields a k = 45, which implies a quantile of = k n = 9% 3 . Moreover, in order to quantify the evolution of "(in)stability", a 500 day sub-sample moving (weekly) window is used to construct a time-series for the Risk-Stability Index (see Table 2 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics of the RSI).
2 This is the same technique as for choosing the tail-index with a Hill-plot (see Hill, 1975) , in which we have a trade-o¤ between "too small" or "too large" k. If k is "too small", then we choose too few observations and the variance of the estimator is large. If on the other hand, k is "too large", then we are incorporating "non-extreme" observations (i.e. observations from the middle of the distribution), and therefore we would impose a bias to the estimator.
3 I also performed the analysis with a 200 day sub-sample moving (weekly) window. The quantile for this exercise was = 20 200 = 10%. Moreover, the results that follow stayed relatively unchanged. 
Distress to Financial System
As previously mentioned, the risk-stability index makes it possible to quantify how the "failure" of a bank can a¤ect a …nancial system, be it economy-wide or worldwide. 4 In simple terms, the risk-stability index gives an estimation of the number of risk-factors that would "catch a cold",
given that a speci…c risk-factor "sneezes". Therefore, a risk-stability index (equation 7) close to d 1 means that risk-factor i has a high in ‡uence on the …nancial system, while an RSI close to 0 implies a negligible e¤ect of risk-factor i on a portfolio (or …nancial system). An immediate result that stands out from Figure 1 is the severity of the banking crisis surrounding "the great recession". As the RSI indicates, the global …nancial system was severely unstable surrounding the events related to demise of Bear Stearns, and the discovery of sub-prime mortgage backed securities around the world. The collapse of Lehman Brothers also had a signi…cant impact in exacerbating systemic risk; however, this impact was slightly less severe than the shocks emanating from the gradual collapse of Bear Stearns. The RSI also indicates that in the two years prior to the beginning of "the great recession", the banking system was already experiencing severe bouts of distress (in contrast to the period beginning in the summer of 2009, when systemic risk had declined and remained, thereafter, at a low level). Last but not least, it is worth pointing out that throughout the entire period shown in Figure 1 , banks tended to a¤ect about 9 other banks, on average; this implies an average infection rate of 31% (Asian banks have an infection rate of 34%, while European and U.S. banks have an infection rate of 30% each).
Once 
Directionality of Distress
In this subsection, I aim at uncover the directionality of distress by employing, for tractability purposes, 8 periods of 500 days each (with a one-year overlap). The results of this particular exercise are presented through Figure 5 , which shows how the directionality of contagion to the …nancial system has evolved through the time surrounding "the great recession". This is accomplished by looking at how many banks will experience a "tail-event" at time t, given that bank "i" experienced a "tail-event" at t 1.
Figure 5: Directionality of Contagion -the …gure shows the consequences to the banking system conditional on bank i "failing" one period before (see footnote 5 for period coding). For example, 1 2 (on the x-axis) shows the repercussion to the system in period 2, given that bank i "fails" in period 1. Risk-Stability
Index
Figure 5 5 con…rms that banks also a¤ect the …nancial system with a lag; however, they do so at irregular intervals and with di¤erent magnitudes. This implies that the system is constantly under stress, where the source of the stress varies from period to period. Figure 5 also shows that the systemic impact of a tail-event in the banking system was higher in the year preceding "the great recession", since if a bank had "failed" in period 5, at least ten other banks would have experienced the same tail-event one period later. These results are corroborated by the facts discussed in sub-section 3.2, where we discovered that systemic risk began to build around the beginning of 2007. Interestingly, the lagged e¤ect of the failure of Lehman Brothers is somewhat negligible, less than …ve banks su¤ered (a period later) because if its collapse.
Persistence of Distress
In order to capture the persistence of distress for bank i in a …nancial system, we need to capture systemic risk in a bivariate setting (in this case, systemic risk with itself). 6 I do this through the conditional probability of joint failure, which is a special measure of two-dimensional tail dependence (see the appendix, and Garita and Zhou, 2009), displayed here as Figure 6 .
The result stemming from the CPJF, and as shown in Figure 6 , indicate that, during the "great recession", the Japanese bank Mizuho experienced the most persistence of distress with an average CP JF of 78%. In 2006, Mizuho started incurring massive losses on subprime investments; and in 2008, it lost more than US$6 billion on subprime investments, the most among Japan's top banks. Table 3 indicates that banks are highly interlinked especially within geographical borders. For example, Asian banks tend to experience the most persistence of distress on average, with a 22% conditional probability of joint failure at time t, given that the same Asian bank experienced distress at t 1. Within Asia, Korean banks have a propensity to create and experience higher systemic risk for themselves (CP JF = 25%). Asian (Korean) banks are followed by U.S. banks with a 16% CPJF, and then by European banks with an 10% CPJF, on average. These set of results corroborate Hartmann et al. (2007) , who argued that in a more integrated banking system (e.g. the United States) area-wide systemic risk is higher, and that the lower overall spillover risk in Europe is due to the weak extreme cross-border linkages.
Mizuho was followed by Lehman Brothers
From Table 3 we can also discern how banks are a¤ecting each other across regions. The Figure   indicates that Asian banks are the most contagious for Europe (CP JF = 18%), followed by US banks (CP JF = 17%). However, US banks do not lag that far behind their Asian counterparts, since when a US bank experiences a "tail-event" in period t 1, a European or Asian bank will experience the same tail event in period t with a CPJF of 17%, on average. Lastly, European banks seem to be the less contagious for both Asian and US banks (average CP JF = 11:5%). 
VAR Analysis
This section implements a panel-data vector autoregression methodology (see Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Love and Ziccino, 2006) in order to uncover the feedback e¤ect from the banking system to the rest of the economy. This procedure merges the traditional VAR and panel-data methodologies, by allowing for endogeneity and for unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, when applying the VAR approach to panel data, it is crucial that the underlying structure be the same for each cross-sectional unit (Love and Ziccino, 2006) . Since this constraint is likely to be violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction is to allow for "individual heterogeneity"; that is by introducing …xed e¤ects in the levels of the variables. However, due to the lags of the dependent variables, the …xed e¤ects are correlated with the regressors; therefore, the usual approach of "mean di¤erencing"would create biased coe¢ cients. Therefore, in order to avoid this problem, the panel VAR methodology uses forward mean-di¤erencing, also known as the "Helmert procedure" (see Arrellano and Bover, 1995; Love and Ziccino, 2006) . This transformation preserves the orthogonality between the transformed variables and the lagged regressors; thereby allowing the use of the lagged regressors as instruments and the estimation of the coe¢ cients through a system GMM.
The impulse-response functions describe the reaction of one variable to the innovations in another variable in the system, while holding all other shocks equal to zero. However, since the actual variance-covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, it is necessary to decompose the residuals in such a way that they become orthogonal, in order to isolate shocks to one of the variables in the system. The usual convention is to adopt a particular ordering and allocate any correlation between the residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes …rst in the ordering. 7 The identifying assumption is that the variables that come earlier in the ordering a¤ect the following variables contemporaneously, as well as with a lag, while the variables that come later a¤ect the previous variables only with a lag. In other words, the variables that appear earlier in the system are more exogenous, and the ones that appear later are more endogenous. Finally, to analyze the impulse-response functions we need an estimate of their con…dence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed from the estimated VAR coe¢ cients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. Accordingly, the standard errors of the impulse response functions and the con…dence intervals are generated through Monte Carlo simulations.
The panel VAR employs the RSI time-series (see Figures 1 4) , and the following …nancial market variables (from St.Louis FRED and CBOE): the short rate (e¤ective federal funds rate), the term spread (di¤. between 10-year and 3-month Treasury constant maturity rates), the market return (returns on the S&P 500), and the VIX, which is the implied market volatility.
The number of lags in the panel VAR system equals 2, and is selected through the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria.
The reaction of the macroeconomy and the market to banking system shocks are as follows (see column 1 in Figure 7 ): an increase of the risk-stability index lowers the federal funds rate, while increasing the slope of the term structure; this suggests that monetary policy reacts to …nancial instability concerns. The results of the panel VAR also indicate that a higher conditional probability of joint failure, and an increased sensitivity of market participants to higher failure risk deteriorates the general market, by lowering the returns to the S&P 500. Last but not least, the perception of market participants that the VIX is the "fear index" is corroborated by the results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index increases the implied volatility of the market.
Figure 7: Impulse-Responses of a one standard deviation shock for 2-lag Panel VAR (errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte Carlo with 1000 replications). RSI = risk-stability index; FFR = e¤ective federal funds fate; T.Spread = di¤erence between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity Rate; SP500 ret = returns on the SP500; VIX = implied volatility of the market. As is well known, the VAR framework allows for a feedback e¤ect (see row 4 in Figure 7 ) from the macro-economy and the general …nancial market to the banking system. This feedback e¤ect
shows that an increase in the federal funds rate (used as a proxy for the global interest rate)
reduces the risk-stability index. This indicates that "leaning against the wind" decreases the instability of the …nancial (banking) system. Moreover, the results also indicate that an improve-ment in the returns to the S&P 500, as well as a reduction of the VIX (i.e. of market volatility), reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk. The variance decomposition (Table   4) con…rms the above-mentioned results. More speci…cally, the RSI explains about 5:5% of interest rate movements, especially at longer horizons (30 weeks). However, the RSI only has marginal explanatory power of the returns to the S&P 500 and the VIX. On the other hand, the returns to the S&P 500 explain more of the risk-stability index variation than any other variable (especially at longer time horizons), followed by the VIX. T. Spread = Di¤. between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity rate; VIX = implied volatility of the market.
Conclusion
The macro-prudential view, which elicits explicit supervision of "asset prices" and the stability of the …nancial system, has by now gained wide acceptance among economists. Nonetheless, implementing macro-prudential regulation depends, largely, on the operational feasibility. Despite this "obstacle", the research herein o¤ers a good foundation and a useful starting point towards understanding the rapport between …nancial (in)stability, systemic risk, and the real economy.
Accordingly, the contribution of this paper to the literature has been three-fold: …rst, it empirically uncovers the directionality and persistence of distress surrounding "the great recession", where the results indicate that, on average, Asian banks create slightly more instability to the …nancial system, very closely followed by U.S. banks, and then by European banks. Second, it quanti…es the reaction of the macro-economy to …nancial system shocks. An increase of the RSI lowers the federal funds rate, while increasing the slope of the term structure. This result suggests that monetary policy reacts to …nancial instability concerns. The results of the panel VAR also indicate that a higher conditional probability of joint failure, and an increased sensitivity of market participants to higher failure risk deteriorates the general market by lowering the returns to the S&P 500. Moreover, the perception of market participants that the VIX is the "fear index" is corroborated by the results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index increases the implied volatility of the market. Third, the paper unearths feedback e¤ects from the macro-economy to the (in)stability of a banking system. These latter set of results indicate that "leaning against the wind" can help reduce the systemic risk in/of a …nancial system. Last but not least, the results show that an improvement in the returns to the S&P 500, as well as a reduction of market volatility, reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk.
The paper has also underscored that systemic risk varies from period to period, thus supporting the idea that …nancial (in)stability is a continuum. Therefore, the monitoring of …nancial stability within and between economies should be a counter-cyclical continuous process. This analysis must be wide-ranging, probing all risk-factors that in ‡uence the …nancial system; furthermore, it should be intended at the early detection of …nancial vulnerabilities, which can arise (from) anywhere and at any time, as this paper has quanti…ed.
Another aspect that continues to be debated by academics and regulators is whether regulation should be aimed at institutions that are either "too big to fail" or "too interconnected to fail".
While not directly tested herein, it seems that "too big to fail" is not a major factor in explaining the instability of a …nancial system. However, "too interconnected to fail", does seem to be of more importance. This is something that future research will have to uncover.
Appendix
Conditional Probability of Joint Failure Garita and Zhou (2009) de…ne the "conditional probability of joint failure" (CPJF), which is a special measure of two-dimensional tail dependence, as follows: given that at least one risk-factor "fails", the CPJF is de…ned as the conditional probability that the other risk-factor will also "fail". Let X = (X 1 ; X 2 ; :::; X d ) represent the losses of d number of individual risk factors, then, the corresponding V aR (value at risk) at probability level of any two variables are V aR i ( ) and V aR j ( ). We then de…ne:
CP JF i;j = lim !0 P (X i > V aR i ( ) and X j > V aR j ( )jX i > V aR i ( ) or X j > V aR j ( ))
which can be rewritten as
where
P (X i > V aR i ( )) + P (X j > V aR j ( )) 1 P (X i V aR i ( ); X j V aR j ( ))
is the dependence measure introduced by Embrechts et al. (2000) , and …rst applied by Hartman et al. (2004) . Under the mEVT framework, the limit in (8) and (10) exists (see De Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7) . A higher CPJF between two risk-factors indicates that a "failure" of these two institutions is more likely to occur at the same time; moreover, the CPJFs may vary, which highlights the di¤erent linkages during crisis periods. In the two-dimensional case, the CPJF can be written as CP JF = lim !0 P (X 1 and X 2 ) P (X 1 or X 2 ) = lim !0 P (X 1 ) + P (X 2 ) P (X 1 or X 2 ) P (X 1 or X 2 ) = lim 
The CPJF always lies between 0 and 1. If it is zero, then the probability of joint failure is negligible; however, if it is one, then the "failure" of a risk factor in a portfolio will always go hand in hand with the downfall of the other risk factor. An important point to keep in mind before proceeding, is that conditional probabilities do not necessarily imply causation; however, this set of bilateral conditional probabilities of joint failure do provide important insights into the interlinkages and the likelihood of contagion between risk-factors in a portfolio (e.g. banks in a …nancial system). Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10 Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10 Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10 
